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10. Resource rationality is useful for choosing between models with the same cognitive 
constraints but cannot settle fundamental disagreements about what those constraints are. 
We argue that sampling is an especially compelling constraint, as optimizing accumulation of 
evidence or hypotheses minimizes the cost of time, and there are well-established models for 
doing so which have had tremendous success explaining human behavior.  
11. In the target article, the case for resource rational analyses is made in general terms: it is 
a widely-applicable method for identifying how to best use cognitive resources given a set of 
cognitive constraints, and the long list of successes of this approach shows how resource 
rational analyses explain a wide range of behavior. We are sympathetic to the overall thrust 
of the article, and particularly the argument that resource rational analyses are useful for 
choosing between models with common cognitive constraints. Resource rationality provides 
a principled method for identifying how cognitive resources are used to solve tasks while 
assisting in identifying the important cognitive constraints.  
 
But a key challenge for resource rational analyses, which was highlighted in the target article, 
is identifying what the key cognitive constraints are. The long list of success in the target 
article is a heterogeneous one – it is comprised of many different approaches that are 
responding to different cognitive constraints, including neural constraints, representational 
constraints, time constraints, and attentional constraints, amongst others.  
 
Researchers have tended to focus on a single constraint, rather than looking at them jointly. 
And indeed, different constraints do not necessarily all sit comfortably with one another, nor 
are they jointly necessary to explain behavioral biases. For concreteness, we focus on one of 
the topics discussed in the target article: biases in human probability judgments (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974).  
 
Several explanations have been advanced for these biases which appeal to resource 
rationality as a justification. One of the most influential explanations is that these biases are 
the result of estimating the probability of complex events (i.e., conjunctions and disjunctions 
of events) by averaging individual event probabilities together, rather than combining them 
correctly (Fantino, Kulik, Stolarz-Fantino, & Wright, 1997). A resource rational justification for 
averaging is that it is more accurate in the presence of internal or external noise than the 
correct combination rule (Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009).  
 
Models based on quantum probability have also been used to explain these behavioral 
biases, and make predictions that are similar to those of averaging. However, the underlying 
mechanisms of these models are very different from averaging, and also have a different 
resource rational justification: instead of appealing to robustness to noise, they are justified 
as conserving representational resources (Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood, 2011).  
 
The third approach is covered in the target article: that people do not have access to their 
subjective probabilities, but are able to generate samples of events from either memory or 
an internal model. After an infinite number of samples, people could in principle recover 
their subjective probabilities exactly; but sampling is slow and effortful.  With small samples, 
biases are introduced according to where sampling begins and by how small samples are 
converted into estimates. The resource rational justification here is that generating samples 
takes time and effort – people make judgments and decisions with a small number of 
samples to optimally allocate time between different opportunities and challenges 
(Dasgupta, Schulz, & Gershman, 2017; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Zhu, Sanborn, & Chater, 
2018a). 
 
These three explanations appeal to very different, and likely mutually exclusive, cognitive 
constraints. As a result, resource rationality cannot be used to directly adjudicate between 
them. The best way to do so remains designing clever experiments for which the candidate 
models make different predictions. However, we argue that because resource rationality is 
part of the argument for each of these explanations, it is still useful to evaluate how 
compelling the cognitive constraints are and how well resource rationality has been applied.  
 
We believe the cognitive constraint of sampling (in a broad sense, e.g., generating evidence 
or hypotheses in proportion to underlying probabilities) is especially compelling, as it is well-
established both theoretically and empirically. In many contexts, the sampling process is slow 
and serial (Maylor, Chater, & Jones, 2001), and therefore it is clearly important to optimize 
this time cost. Resource rationality is a starting point for many models using sampling: how to 
optimally stop sampling is well established, both for accumulating until a target confidence is 
reached and for stopping as soon as the expected cost exceeds the expected gain (Bogacz, 
Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014; 
Wald, 1950). Models based on sequential sampling and optimal stopping have been 
extremely successful in both perceptual decision-making, and in wider forms of decision 
making (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Shadlen & Shohamy, 2016). Indeed, sampling limitations 
underlie other examples discussed in the target article: why people probability match, and 
why very good and very bad events are over-weighted. 
 
Other constraints, such as representational or process noise constraints, are less well-
attested and their consequences less clear cut. For example, applying representational 
constraints require first establishing what the representations are, and the nature of 
cognitive representations is often controversial (Spicer & Sanborn, 2019). Internal noise is 
commonly used as a constraint - and indeed individual neurons are noisy - but in aggregate 
this noise may be less important than it seems (Beck, Ma, Pitkow, Latham, & Pouget, 2012), 
and its consequences again depend on the form of the representation. While some aspects 
of the sampling process do also depend on the representation (Dasgupta, et al., 2017; Zhu, 
Sanborn, & Chater, 2018b), the fundamental goal of minimizing the number of samples 
remains.  
 
Finally, beyond its usefulness as a cognitive constraint, sampling also satisfies other 
desiderata of the resource rationality approach. As resource rational analyses start from 
formulating a computational solution to a problem, sampling from the posterior is a useful 
algorithmic constraint to consider, because samplers are general algorithms for performing 
inference. Sampling models also have a clear connection to AI and statistics, where these 
methods are widely used in Bayesian inference, and as a result can ease transfer of 
knowledge between these fields and the cognitive and brain sciences. For these reasons and 
those above, sampling is a very compelling cognitive constraint for resource rationality to 
target. 
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